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I Global Social Policy Discourses:
Towards a Socially Responsible
Globalisation?
In an earlier publication (Deacon 1997) I argued
that the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
regarded welfare expenditure as a burden on the
economy which enabled it to oversee the cutting of
public spending on social provirion, and that the
World Bank's focus on poverty alleviation led it to
favour a safety net approach within which the role
of the state should be limited to that of providing a
minimum level of provision primarily for the poor.
Within the International Labour Organisation
(ILO) and some other UN agencies, on the other
hand, were to be found supporters of the view that
social expenditures were a means of securing social
cohesion. The ILO in particular supported a con-
servative-corporatist Bismarckian type of social
protection system within which Pay-As-You-Go
financed social security systems should play a large
role. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) favoured the notion
that certain state welfare expenditures should be
regarded as a necessary investment. No interna-
tional organisation, save possibly UNICEF, could
be said to defend the redistributive approach to
social policy characteristic of the Scandinavian
countries. In that study it was concluded that the
opportunity created by the 'collapse of com-
munism' for the global actors to shape the
future of social policy has been grasped enthu-
siastically by the dominant (social liberal) ten-
dency in the World Bank. In alliance with
social development NGOs ... a social safety net
future is being constructed. This NGO support
combined with the political support of many
southern and some East European govern-
ments is challenging powerfully those defend-
ers of universalist and social security based
welfare states to be found in the EU, the ILO
and ... in smaller numbers in the Bank.
(Deacon 1997: 197)
While these conclusions still broadly stand, there
continue to be interesting shifts in the position of
particular players within this debate. The IMF has
taken the social dimension of globalisation more
seriously, considering whether some degree of
equity is beneficial to economic growth (IMF
1998). At the same time, however, the director of
the fiscal affairs department of the IMP has argued
that globalisation threatens the revenue raising
capacity of governments, concluding that 'the world
must prepare itself for what could prove to be sig-
nificant falls in tax levels' (Tanzi 1999: 14). The
World Bank has more clearly articulated a risk man-
agement approach to social protection, arguing that
individualised defined-contribution private insur-
ance accounts should play a large part in the port-
folio of social protection systems (Holzmann and
Jorgensen 1999). This position had been challenged
with some force by the then Chief Economist of the
Bank (Orsag and Stiglitz 1999), but his premature
resignation from the organisation suggests that the
old guard is still in charge. The OECD (1999) now
warns that globalisation may lead to the need for
more, not less, social expenditure in order to com-
pensate some of the losers from globalisation. The
ILO is showing signs of making concessions to the
Bank's views on privatising some parts of social
security (Gillion et al. 2000), while other moves
within the ILO (Standing 2000) suggest an interest
in a new universalism emerging from bottom-up
movements in several countries. More recently, the
view of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on
the desirability of a global market in health and
social service provision has assumed a new promi-
nence (Koivusalo 1999). International NGOs are
now more clearly divided into those which substi-
tute for government, and those which advocate
greater government responsibility for welfare
(Fowler 2000). These developments are reviewed
elsewhere (Deacon 2000b), but the developments
as far as the VITO are concerned are elaborated
below because of the importance of these to the
thread of argument in this article.
The thrust of the 1vVTO agenda is to facilitate
increases in the volume of world trade by negotiat-
ing reduced trade barriers. These are often tariff
barriers, but may take the form of restrictions on
the right of foreign private enterprises to compete
'fairly' in other countries. Although the Seattle talks
collapsed because of a reluctance on the part of the
USA, in particular, to meet the demands of some
southern governments on, for example, labour
standards, other controversial issues lurked in the
background. One such was the pressure to increase
trade in services, including in health and education.
The issue will continue to resurface because of the
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in-built WTO agenda to review trade in agriculture
and services (see Price et al. 1999; Koivusalo 1999).
A WTO document notes that the forthcoming
round 'offers members lof the WTOI the opportu-
nity to reconsider the breadth and depth of theïr
commitments on health and social services, which
are currently trailing behind other large sectors'
(WTO 1998a: 1). It notes with approval signs of an
increased global trade in health care from develop-
ing to developed countries 'with better-off people
seeking rapid access to high-quality services
abroad', but is exercised by the fact that under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
services being provided in the exercise of govern-
mental authority on non-commercial and non-com-
petitive bases are excluded from free trade
obligations. It goes on to note that the coexistence
of private and public hospitals may raise questions,
however, concerning their competitive relationship
and the applicability of the GATS', arguing that
where internal competition already exists between a
public and a private health service, foreign private
health service providers should be allowed unre-
stricted rights to compete with national ones.
The parallel paper on education is more restrained
in its ambitions for increased trade, limiting its
comments to the tertiary sector. It does not explic-
itly question the view that basic education (both
primary and secondary education) falls within the
domain of services supplied in the exercise of gov-
ernmental authority and therefore supplied neither
on a commercial basis nor in competition. In rela-
tion to the tertiary sector, however, the paper
reviews all the possible non-tanff barriers to trade
through the four modes of cross-border supply,
consumption abroad, foreign commercial presence
and the presence of 'natural' persons U.e. foreign
professionals) and invites trade ministers to con-
sider how these barriers might be reduced ,WTO
1998b).
Developments within the global social policy dis-
course have, then, been moving in different direc-
tions. The IMF OECD and World Bank appear
more concerned than before about the negative
social impact of globalisation, and are revising
their remedies accordingly Some in the ILO, how-
ever, appear to be retreating from earlier commit-
ments to universal public pension provision,
while the secretariat of the WTO seems uncritically
Table 1: Shifts in global policy and possible criticisms
Shifts in policy thinking
The move from human rights to social rights and from
declaration to implementation
The trend in international development co-operation
towards setting goals and monitoring progress
The move to secure global minimum labour, social and
health standards
The move to establish codes of practice for socially
responsible investment and business
The calls for global economic regulation and taxation
The moves to extend constructive regionalism with a
social dimension
Possible criticisms
But moralising about rights without resource transfers is
counterproductive
But attainable development targets may be a legitimation
of residual social policy
But core labour standards are a lowering of standards for
some
But they may lead to dis-investment in the South
But are the Principles of Good Practice in Social policy
being ignored by the IMF?
But regions are also social protectionist blocks?
committed to a global market in private welfare. I
have argued elsewhere that within this discordant
discourse can be discerned elements of what
appear to be a new politics of global social respon-
sibility (Deacon 1999a). Fundamentalist economic
liberalism and inhumane structural adjustment
appears to be giving way to concern about the
social consequences of globalisation on the part of
the Bank and the IME International development
assistance is focused on social development, and
UN agencies are increasingly exercised by the neg-
ative social consequences of globalisation. Shifts in
policy thinking and concrete steps that are being
taken which could herald a more socially respon-
sible globalisation, and the possible criticisms of
each, are listed in Table 1.
Not all of these steps are given emphasis by the
Bretton Woods organisations. The Bank is reluctant
to embrace the language of labour or social rights,
and the WTO still seems headed in an unrecon-
structed neo-liberal direction. Each of these steps is
problematic in some ways, but taken together they
do seem to suggest a shift away from a global poli-
tics of liberalism to a global politics of social con-
cern. In the next sections we subject two of these
developments to closer scrutiny.
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2 Globalising Social Rights?
This section examines one of the steps towards a
socially responsible globalisation that appears to be
afforded priority attention within the international
dialogue. First, some of the controversy surround-
ing the West's concern with human rights is
reviewed. Then the most recent contribution to this
debate, which focuses on social rights, is sum-
marised.
2.1. Moralising about rights is
counterproductive
The opposition of some southern governments to
global labour standards in the context of free trade
is reflected in an increasingly articulate opposition
to the claims by the West that they are upholding
universal human rights. International human rights
activists seeking to implement the universal decla-
ration of human rights are seen not as 'guardian
angels' (Wheeler 1996), but as supporters of 'global
(imperialist) gangsters' who use ethical claims to
assert a new global hegemony
The view that the West is often hypocritical on these
questions and does not address human rights abuse
in its own backyard has been given prominence
recently by Amnesty International, and by the
Malaysian Prime Minister's comment that the West
does not have a monopoly on human rights.
Cultural diversity has been used to justify different
moral and social policy agendas in Islamic societies
(Dean and Khan 1997), and to argue that in the
Chinese context, European-like social policy
reforms are likely to founder on the rock of
Confucian indifference to the concept of rights
granted by states to its citizens (Wong 1998; Tao
and Driver 1997).
The most powerful criticism of the human rights
stance of western donors has been by Katarina
Tomasevski. She argues that the audience for the
strand of human rights conditionality in aid policy
is primarily domestic, as is the encouragement of
democratic electoralism. The key problematic from
the standpoint of western donor governments is
that the call for political liberalism has gone hand in
hand with economic liberalism, which undermines
the capacity of recipient country governments to
provide the social policies that could underpin the
rhetoric of human rights with substantive social
rights:
The assumption underlying donor's policy that
economic and political liberalisation go hand in
hand undermined human rights by combining
political empowerment with economic dis-
empowerment, which was reflected in dis-
empowering (and impoverishing) the
government, thus ultimately precluding it from
implementing human rights obligations. The
very notion of human rights entails corollary
government obligations. If a government is
unable to raise revenue so as to be able to com-
ply with its human rights obligations, human
rights guarantees become illusory (Tomasevski
1997: 240).
This attempt by the 'international community' to
foster universal human rights, while at the same
time refusing to redistribute adequate resources
from governments that have to those that do not,
forces northern and western social democrats to
defend their ideals against being conflated with free
market imperialism wearing a new moral garb of
social rights. Conversely, the defence of cultural
diversity by some in the South and East leads to the
abandonment of a reasoned search for an agreed
global form of social progress.
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2.2 Principles and good practice in social
policy
Notwithstanding these powerful arguments, and
perhaps emboldened by moves to back up the
West's concerns about rights with more resources
(such as debt reliel), there is now a renewed asser-
tion of: (a) the universalism of human rights; (b)
their social dimension; and (c) the means for effec-
tively realising global social rights. The backcloth to
this move was the intervention by the UK
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, to
link discussion of the need to regulate global capi-
tal flows with a perceived need to attend to or pre-
vent the damaging social consequences of
speculative capital movements, l-le argued for a
code 'of global best practice in social policy which
will apply for every country will set minimum stan-
dards and will ensure that when IMP and World
Bank help a country in trouble the agreed pro-
gramme of reform will preserve investments in the
social, education, and employment programmes
which are essential for growth', and suggested this
should be agreed at the spring 1999 meeting of the
World Bank (Brown 1999).
The question then became one of responsibility for
devising the code. The UKS Department for
International Development provided some initial
thinking, suggesting that best practice involved: (a)
equitable access to basic social services; (b) social
protection to reduce vulnerability to shocks; and (c)
core labour standards. Controversy developed
around which international organisation should
have the mandate to devise the code - the Bank
with its concern to claim global expertise on these
issues, or the UN with its social policy mandate.
The Bank first claimed the right to set the standards,
but objections led to their referral to the UN, with
the Bank agreeing to help implement them.
This referral to the UN had more to do with con-
cern on the part of some southern governments
that the IMP and the Bank would use the new
principles as social conditionality on loans or debt
relief, than with any desire to empower the UN.
While some in the UN have welcomed this move,
others suggest that it let the Bank and IMF off the
hook of global social responsibility that the princi-
ples were designed to facilitate (Howard 2000).
The danger is that the new global financial archi-
tecture will be shaped without reference to the
social policy principles. lt is now up to the United
Nations, and in particular the Preparatory
Committee for the Geneva 2000 meeting, to do the
technical work. The Bank has produced a first draft
which suggests that the principles should be based
upon: (a) unïversal and equitable access to basic
social services; (b) enabling men and women to
attain secure and sustainable livelihoods and decent
working conditions; (c) promoting social protection
systems, and d) fostering social inclusion. The core
labour standards element suggested by the UK
Government was dropped. The Social Policy and
Social Development secretariat of the UN is con-
cerned that the principles are taken forward in a
way which encompasses both the 'soft' aspects of
social policy and the 'hard' aspects of economic pol-
icy If this were to be an outcome of the
'Copenhagen plus 5' process, it might empower the
UN in the management of global economic and
social policy The issue was not considered further
at the Annual Meetings of the World Bank and IM?
in September 1999, even though Gordon Brown
chaired the IMF's International Monetary and
Financial Committee. It seems that a social code
will not, after all, be among those that the IMF is
asked to monitor.
In early 2000 these principles may be firmed up for
adoption at the Geneva 2000 meeting. It is to be
hoped that the final code for best practice in social
policy should not slant too far in the direction of
targeting and privatisation. It would have to explain
what the alternative poles of universalism and pub-
lic responsibility might mean for countries at differ-
ent levels of development. It is to be hoped, too,
that it avoids the view that the code should be
restricted to basic education and health services.
The danger of limiting the new concern with global
social rights to only basic level provision will be
returned to below.
3 Moving Social Policy up the
Development Agenda?
While aid flows from north to south have been
reduced in the past decade (Development
Information Update 1999), there have also been
concerted efforts to use it more effectively More of
it is focused on the social aspects of development
(including health and education), and efforts are
being made to win developing country co-operation
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by, for example, the 20:20 initiative to ensure that
20 per cent of aid is for social purposes, and 20 per
cent of developing country public expenditure
matches this. The major donors have set targets
which are believed to be attainable. There is also the
prospect of significant debt relief in the first year of
the new century This section reviews some of the
controversies around these developments.
3.1 Attainable development targets: global
social progress or legitimating residual
social policy?
International development co-operation appears to
have moved a long way from the days of structural
adjustment programmes overseen by the Bank and
the IMF with no concern for their short-term nega-
tive social consequences. There is a 'new consensus
that aid ought to go to poor countries based on
assessments of performance in areas of macroeco-
nomic policy, poverty reduction, and the exercise of
good governance' (Gwin 1999: 2). Responding to
the criticisms of global civil society and UN agen-
cies, the Bank first articulated a concern for poverty
alleviation in this context in 1990. At that point, the
dominant aid paradigm became one of broad-based
growth, basic social services and safety nets. Many
argued that while this marked some progress it also
represented the institutionalisation globally of a
residual approach to social policy and provision.
lt remains to be seen whether, in the wake of the
argument by Stiglitz (1998) that there is a need to
rethink the Washington Consensus, Bank policy on
social development issues and social policy issues
moves further from liberalism with safety nets.
There are mixed messages. The first draft of the
World Bank's WDR-2001 on poverty (World Bank
2000) proposed a four-pronged approach involving
empowerment, security, opportunity and interna-
tional structural issues. In the section dealing with
unemployment insurance, however, the obsession
with targeting the poor remains. The current draft
reads 'the key issue ... is to design [these schemesi
so that they maintain their function of providing
insurance for the very poor and are not captured by
the not so poor'. At the same time, Wolfensohn's
proposal for a Comprehensive Development
Framework (Wolfensohn 1999a), mentioned but
not elaborated in the 1999-2000 World
Development Report, covers good governance, an
effective legal system, and supervised financial sys-
tems, but the social dimension is still discussed in
terms of safety nets, universal primary education
and communal and local level health services. On
the positive side, the draft does not come down
firmly in favour of private provision of higher levels
of education and health care.
In the work of the Social Protection section of the
Banlvi Human Development Network the main
thrust of the emerging policy paper is towards
enabling individuals and families to protect them-
selves from risk through a risk management strategy
(Holzmann and Jorgensen 1999). The conclusions
on income maintenance policy are in keeping with
the market orientation of the Bank which, the draft
paper argues, 'fosters the ïmportance of ... multi-
pillar pension systems, individual social accounts to
handle multiple risks (unemployment, sickness,
disability, survivorship, old age)' and 'puts the role
of government in perspective: governments have an
important role for the establishing and functioning
of informal and market-based arrangements; gov-
ernments and public administration also have their
own agenda, exposing such arrangements to politi-
cal risk'. Hardly a rallying cry for universal, pub-
licly-provided services financed out of
redistributive taxationl
lt should not be taken for granted, then, that the
new fashion for setting achievable development tar-
gets constitutes unalloyed global social progress.
Many European social policy ministries would be
worried if the logic behind these moves in southern
social development policy were to be applied in the
North. The OECD/Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) set a number of targets for devel-
opment policy which focus on the poorest of the
poor in poor countries, including halving the num-
ber of people in extreme poverty, making basic edu-
cation available to all girls and boys, enabling access
for all to reproductive health services, with con-
comitant reductions in maternal and infant mortal-
ity rates and gender inequality (OECD!DAC 1997).
The two positives in this approach are: (a) the inclu-
sion in the agreed measures of poverty of one indi-
cator of inequality (the poorest fifth's share of
national consumption), suggesting that redistribu-
tion policies are not entirely forgotten; and (b) the
fact that measurable and attainable targets and
monitoring systems are in place. The other side of
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the coin remains the limited nature of the goals for
public service provision. This leaves ample scope
for the privatisation of the rest of social provision
while international attention is focused only on
basic service delivery.
As debt relief gets underway and the search for
ways of ensuring that the liberated funds are spent
on social welfare becomes more urgent, these issues
take on more importance. At stake is whether the
world lines up behind a set of best practices for
social policy fashioned out of the immediate con-
tingencies of a South made poor by the North and
reflecting a residualist orientation, or whether it
applies to the task of social development the lessons
of the European struggle for social welfare - that
only universalistic and inclusive approaches to
social provision ensure stability peace, security and
social well-being for all.
4 Undermining the Preconditions
for Equitable Social Development:
the New Challenge
This article has argued that at the level of global dis-
course there has been a shift in recent years from
the politics of global social irresponsibility to the
politics of global social concern. The emerging
dominant intellectual strand within and around the
World Bank and international development com-
munity agrees that:
global macroeconomic management needs to
address the social consequences of globalisation
a set of social rights and entitlements to which
global citizens might aspire can he fashioned
international development co-Upe ration will
focus on meeting basic social needs
debt relief should be speeded up so long as the
funds are used to alleviate poverty
the globalisation of trade generates the need for
the globalisation of labour and social standards
good governments are an essential ingredient in
encouraging socially responsible development.
This is a long way from the situation over a decade
ago, which prompted the writing of Adjustment with
a Human Face (Cornia et al. 1987); one could almost
be tempted to label the new era 'globalisation with a
human face'. There are, however, disagreements as to
how to proceed with this new orientation:
much of the South is suspicious of even progres-
sive social conditionality
how both world trade and world labour stan-
dards can coexist without the standards being
reduced to minimal core standards or being used
for protectionist purposes is far from clear
initiatives to empower the UN with global rev-
enue raising powers are firmly resisted.
The argument running through this article has
focused on a different concern. In sum, we argue
that even if disagreements over how the new global
social agenda were to be implemented and funded
could be overcome, this would generate a situation
which would pose a threat to equitable social policy
and development. The history of the struggle to
build welfare states teaches us that social equity and
high levels of universal social provision have only
been secured and retained when those services are
available to and used by the middle class. It is the
sharp elbow of the middle class every bit as much
as working class pressure andlor concern for the
poor that has ensured good quality social provision.
The better-off will only be taxed if they also benefit.
The coexistence of four tendencies within the new
global paradigm, if pursued, will undermine this
essential precondition for equitable social progress
just as the world enters a new millennium with the
resources to fund such equitable development.
These are:
the World Bank's belief that governments should
only provide minimal levels of social protection
the OECD/DAC's concern to fund only basic
education and health care
the International NGOs' self-interest in substi-
tuting for government services
the moves being made within the WTO to speed
up the global market in private health care,
social care, education and insurance services.
Within the context of withering state provision, the
middle classes of developing and transition
economies will be enticed into the purchase of pri-
vate social security schemes, secondary and tertiary
education, and medical care. The providers of such
private services will be American or European
enterprises. The potential to build on cross-class
social contracts from the colonial era to build new
welfare states will be undermined by the pre-
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existence of the global market in private social pro-
vision. The conditions facing the emerging middle
class of many countries in the context of globalisa-
tion will be fundamentally different from the condi-
tions that had faced earlier middle classes who
helped fashion earlier welfare states. The result is
predictable: we know that services for the poor are
poor services, and that developed countries that do
not have universal public health provision and pub-
lic education provision are not only more unequal
but also more unsafe and crime-ridden.
While the global social development lobby congrat-
ulate themselves on shifting the global agenda so
that debt relief to reduce poverty and universal
access to basic education are the new orthodoxy
they are mostly blind to the threats to social equity
in both North and South posed by the pincer move-
ment of the Bank and the WTO fashioning a private
welfare future for the global middle class To put it
differently, 'globalisation is unravelling the social
bond' that ensured social justice within countries in
the twentieth century (Devetak and 1-liggott 1999).
This bond will have to be recreated at supranational
level in the twenty-first century
5 Counteracting the Dominant
Tendency: Re-establishing Equity
in the Global Social Policy and
Social Development Discourse
Counteracting this tendency will not be easy Re-
establishing the case for equity in social policy and
social development would require major analytical
and policy changes. Development analysis needs to
shift from a focus on the global poor and their con-
dition to the global rich and their private privileges.
The mapping of emerging global markets in social
welfare is an urgent necessity
It would also require the UN organisations to be
funded out of global taxes, and empowered to work
with the new G-10 group of countries, the IMP,
World Bank, WTO and Global Regional Groupings
to plan in an accountable way for equitable global
development. Such planning would also begin to
rationalise the chaos of subcontracted governance,
which has arisen over the past decade with the pro-
liferation of international NGOs and private aid
agencies competing for tenders (Biekart 1999).
Planning may be unfashionable and ideologically
suspect, but this is in effect what James Wolfensohn
called for when he wrote 'What is needed is a global
partnership to harmonise programmes, policies and
practices .. there must be common standards for
procurement (and) operations . . - the time is ripe
for a co-ordinated attack on the inefficiencies of the
development system' (\Volfensohn 1999b: 8).
It would require a policy of major intra- and inter-
regional public and private resource transfers to
finance public provision at all levels, and a wave of
global regulation to ensure standards and accessi-
bility of globally-provided private health, education
and social services, where these existed in lieu of
public provision. Who is likely to support such a
change to ensure globalisation with a human face -
globalisation with equity in social policy within and
between countries?
For those (such as Martin et al. 1997) who have
faith that the European Union (EU) can and should
act to counter destructive global neo-liberalism
with socially responsible globalisation, the results of
two recent evaluations of the EU make depressing
reading (Deacon 1999b; Van Reisen 1999). The
move to fashion a global set of social rights, which
might be embodied in the emerging global guide-
lines of best practice in social policy, owes little to
the EU. Although the EU contributes a large pro-
portion of international aid, its development policy
lags behind that of other actors in terms of a
focused concern with global inequality, which
means it has been unable to enter the debate about
whether targeting the poor abroad contradicts the
more universalistic social policies operating within
Europe. Little is being contributed by the EU
Commission to debates about global taxation policy,
or moves to socially regulate transnational corpora-
tions. The welcome given by the EU to further dis-
cuss trade liberalisation in the service field seems
uninformed by the potential negative impacts on
governmental responsibility for health and social
services.
These evaluations of just how far even the EU needs
to go is a reminder of the messy state of the global
politics of welfare. The WTO steals the clothes of
global health policy from the WHO and turns
them inside out. Health for all becomes health
markets for all. The Chief Economist of the Bank
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- a key defender of equity as a global goal -
resigns prematurely The ILO squabbles internally
about how to argue for the future of human secu-
rity The inspired global principles of social policy
are sidelined just when they are needed in the con-
text of debt relief. The IMF warns of termites eating
away at the foundations of state budgets.
As far as global social policy and social develop-
ment are concerned, the problem is the fragmenta-
tion and functional separation of international and
regional agencies, and conflict within and between
them for the right to shape global social policy
Could the Geneva 2000 and the subsequent UN
meeting on Finance for Development in 2001
reverse this slide into global social policy anarchy,
and establish a responsible, accountable and
funded global system by means of which intra- and
inter-country equity could be worked towards?
Much will depend not only on the EU improving on
present practice, but also on the emergence of pro-
gressive southern voices who are concerned to
improve the structure of global governance.
At the time of writing (February 2000) it is too early
to judge whether the Geneva 2000 meeting will
advance global politics in this direction. The secre-
tariat of the Social Policy and Social Development
Division of the UN has tabled a set of further initia-
tives to ensure better implementation of the
Copenhagen Summit commitments, including
proposals for additional global resources for social
development (UN 1999). How the EU and G7 cau-
cuses amend these proposals in the April 2000
Preparatory Committee and at Geneva remains to
be seen. The new EU Commission appears to want
to be a m,ore effective voice for global social respon-
sibility (Commission of the European Union 2000).
In the run up to the Geneva meeting, it was argued
by the President of the International Council on
Social Welfare (ICSW) that success in June 2000
should be measured by whether it effectively estab-
lished an international anti-poverty alliance,
whether (following on from the Gordon Brown ini-
tiative) it strengthened international principles and
standards for social development, and whether it
strengthened the UN Economic and Social
Council as a counterweight to the Bank/IMFIWTO
alliance (Disney 1999). Voices from the South,
however, continue to show little interest in the
attempts by northern global reformists to establish
a set of socially responsible ground rules. Walden
Bello of Focus on the Global South has argued that
change 'means not wasting time trying to enlarge
areas of reform within the World Bank, IMF and
WTO' (Bello 1999: 13). Moreover 'the project of
making the UN agencies the pillars of an alternative
global order is not going to result in success for a
long, long time'. He goes on to argue against
attempts to mend the rules of the current global
order as rules can only benefit the North: 'the fewer
structures and the less clear the rules, the better for
the south'. Both the globalists whose safety-net-for-
the-poor strategy I have critiqued, and those such
as myself who argue for improved global gover-
nance structures to plan for equitable social policy,
are faced with severe intellectual and political chal-
lenges by such southern voices.
Note
1. This is a shortened version of a article of the same
title to be published in the 2000 edition of Social
Policy Review. A longer exposition of these ideas is in
Deacon 2000a. The article is based on policy analysis
undertaken by the Globalism and Social Policy
Programme (GASPP), more details of which are
available at ww.stakes.filgaspp. The article was first
delivered as a paper at the IDS Global Social Policy
conference in October 1999.
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